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Early economic research on natural monopoly regulation focused on market failure—
pricing tariffs and externalities. While Coase’s multi-tariff marginal cost pricing 
became the standard, his approach to externality regulation as a contractual issue 
shifted the debate to transaction costs, but failed to recognize the associated political 
hazards. The renewed approach to regulation is more cognizant of the interplay of 
transaction costs and political hazards. In this paper, we show that regulatory 
rigidities arise as a response to political hazards of opportunistic expropriation and 
challenges from interested third parties to public agents.  
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I. Introduction  
Network utilities—water and sewage, electricity, natural gas—are an essential 
element of modern societies. These utilities are characterized by large and non-
redeployable (sunk) capital investment and limited area of service where they tend to 
be the single provider. Their natural monopoly features (i.e., multiple providers may 
render the service more expensive) and the socially sensitive nature of their services 
(i.e., politics comes into play) have led network utilities to face, starting around the 
second half of the XIX century—administratively, legislatively, or contractually— 
governmental regulation.  
At first, economic research on utility regulation focused on market failure: the 
limitation of monopoly pricing and negative externalities, as well as the proper 
incentives to invest in long-term assets. Coase’s multi-tariff marginal cost pricing 
prevailed in the academic debate (if not in practice) over average cost pricing or 
marginal cost pricing with governmental subsidy for investments. While his approach 
to externality regulation as a contractual issue unearthed the relevance of transaction 
costs, it failed to identify the interplay of transaction costs and political hazards faced 
by both public and private agents. Recent research points out how seemingly 
inefficient regulatory features (such a regulatory rigidities) reflect an efficient 
institutional adaptation to political hazards of opportunistic expropriation by the 
government and strategic challenges by interested third parties.  
This paper presents the latest developments in the debate on transaction-cost 
regulation. In section II, we present—in a simplified manner—the evolution of the 
scholarship on market failure and monopoly regulation from pricing and externalities 
(where Coase’s contributions were most significant) to regulatory capture. In section 
III, we present a transaction-cost perspective to regulation and highlight two 
fundamental political hazards: opportunistic challenges to the regulator by third 
parties—political opposition, watchdogs, and interest groups—and opportunistic 
expropriation of investors by the regulator/government. In section IV, we show a 
positive political analysis of the interplay between transaction costs and political 
hazards for regulatory policy. Section V concludes.  
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II. A (Highly Incomplete) History of the Economics of Regulation  
At its origin, the intellectual focus of utility regulation was on limiting 
monopolization from the combination of economies of scale and lack of 
redeployability of the assets. In the first half of the 20th century, there was a vivid 
debate on the pricing of decreasing-average-cost industries (i.e., natural monopolies), 
whose two most prominent representatives where Harold Hotelling and Ronald H. 
Coase (Frischmann and Hogendorn 2015). Hotelling (1938) advocated for a 
government subsidy of the fixed cost component that would enable marginal cost 
pricing for industries with high fixed and low marginal cost; Coase (1946)—who 
arguably succeeded in this debate considering today’s applied industry standards2—
favored a two-part tariff system where the fixed cost is prorated by user and the 
variable part equals the marginal cost. While the profession consensus was that 
marginal cost pricing leads to efficient production, the debate focused then on the 
monopoly’s externalities.  
Coase (1960) presented a bilateral view of externalities and a skeptical perspective on 
government regulation (i.e., a critique of Pigou 1920, who proposed the taxation of 
the externality).3 According to Coase, assuming away transaction costs,4 the efficient 
level of demand for and supply of an externality does not depend on the allocation of 
the initial endowment and property rights of the agents. Hence, the regulator should 
assign the property rights where they would end if there weren’t transaction costs. 
Thus, considering monopoly as an externality, granting the property rights to 
customers would only redistribute wealth between the monopolist and the customers, 
without affecting the outcome (under a two-part tariff with marginal cost pricing). 
	
2 Cf. Coase (1970).  
3 Coase’s 1960 paper was a generalization of his 1959 paper on the regulation of radio frequencies 
when competing radio stations interfere which each other. In short, if property rights in radio 
frequencies were well defined, it would ultimately be irrelevant whether adjacent radio stations 
interfered with each other by broadcasting in the same frequency band. Nor did it matter to whom the 
property rights were granted, since the station able to reap the higher economic gain from broadcasting 
would have an incentive to pay the other station not to interfere. Consequently, in the absence of 
transaction costs, both stations would strike a mutually advantageous deal, and regulation of 
frequencies (other than assigning property rights) would be unnecessary. 
4 In particular, assuming: (a) perfectly defined and costlessly enforced property rights and contracts; (b) 
all parties being rational and present at the bargaining table with complete, symmetric information; and 
(c) perfect bargaining, with no free-riding or hold-up problems. 
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Demsetz (1968) questioned the rationale for regulation based on the common notion5 
that a natural monopoly always charges monopoly price. In Coase’s (1960) spirit, 
Demsetz sustained that if “negotiating cost” (i.e., transaction costs in today’s 
institutional terminology) equals zero, then the natural monopoly would be 
contestable (i.e., there could be competition for the market, as opposed to competition 
within the market). According to Demsetz long-term incomplete contracts suffice and 
administrative and legislative regulation is only desirable when ownership rights’ 
coordination is costly and when “windfalls” (externalities) are at place.  
Telser (1969) refocused the discussion on regulation to secure efficiency and to 
promote public welfare. Using a spatial model, he showed that the arrival of a new 
entrant to an economies-of-scale industry presents two network externalities: an 
increase in the average cost and a decrease in the transportation (servicing) cost. The 
demand conditions imply that the total output will not lead to an efficient allocation of 
output per plant and the number of plants unless firm entry is franchised and the price 
directly controlled by a regulator to satisfy a pre-established social benefit. The spatial 
model is particularly appropriate to public utilities, because it introduces “locality”—
so closely related to the political dimension of regulation—but Telser was silent 
regarding plausible heterogeneous (political) preferences in the zones and the 
workings of the regulator, who—as was the norm—is assumed to be a benevolent 
social planner.6  
Coase (1974), in his study on the history of British lighthouses, presented regulation 
as a cooperative arrangement between users and the operator, with the franchise—and 
enforcement—of the government. 7  In Coase’s framework, customers (shipping 
companies) interested in a particular service (lighthouse services at a specific 
location) would sponsor a potential operator with a license application to the 
	
5 Cf. Samuelson (1964). 
6  “[S]ociety can set [the marginal cost of production] equal to whatever value it decides is the 
appropriate measure of the marginal social benefit” (Telser 1969, 943).  
7 This resembles, to a large extent, the way Great Britain granted licenses. Licenses were granted in 
many different forms. Until 1919, the most common way was for a prospective utility to apply to 
Parliament for a particular license. A Select Committee would hear the case and either recommend it or 
not. The Select Committee’s recommendation would then be presented—as a simple formality—to 
Parliament for approval as a “Private Bill.” A license could also be granted by an Order in Council, 
whereby the Privy Council upon recommendation of the relevant Minister and the Cabinet would grant 
the license. See Spiller (2005). 
5 
Government for the selected operator.8 The Government would enforce the licensee’s 
property rights to charge the agreed upon charges to all shipping companies.9  Coase’s 
lighthouse example resembles the way investment in natural gas pipelines takes place 
in the US, whereby a potential pipeline operator solicits interest from potential 
shippers through an “open season.” Once sufficient interest is reported, the operator 
requests a license from the Government, which also stipulates pricing rules.10 This 
process, however, is inapplicable for massively consumed utility services, as the 
number of customers makes such coordinated collective action extremely difficult, if 
not impossible.  
Echoing Demsetz’ coordination problem, Posner (1972) proposed a mechanism with 
an “open season,” during which all franchise bidders would offer their products to 
consumers. This would not be just a non-bidding presentation; franchise bidders 
would try to secure real orders from potential consumers. At the end of this period, 
the orders collected by franchise bidders would be compared and the franchise would 
be given to the bidder who secured the highest revenue. In this way, consumer 
preferences would be inferred from their willingness to pay, and the winner would be 
the bidder who, in free competition, would be preferred by the majority of consumers. 
To secure fair competition, each candidate would commit to provide the price and 
quantity they offered. If they failed, the franchise would be withdrawn and a new 
“open season” announced. 
As Williamson (1976) pointed out, although the introduction of pre-contract offering 
in Posner's conception was ingenious, it is not practicable. First, it assumes that 
consumers are able to make an abstract evaluation of price–quality packages and that 
they have the time and willingness to do so, which poses the problem of bounded 
	
8 In principle, the operator would have been selected based on an unspecified mechanism. 
9 The selected method in the lighthouse case is for the lighthouse operator to charge a fee to all ships 
docking at certain ports. See Coase (1974). 
10 See, for example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s policy statements on: “Promoting 
Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform” (Docket No. RM11-26-000, issued November 15, 
2012), “Allocation of Capacity on New Merchant Transmission Projects and New Cost-Based, 
Participant-Funded Transmission Projects” and “Priority Rights to New Participant-Funded 
Transmission” (Docket Nos. AD12-9-000 and AD11-11-000, issued January 17, 2013), and “Cost 
Recovery Mechanisms for Modernization of Natural Gas Facilities” (Docket No. PL15-1-000, issued 
November 20, 2014), available at: http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/policy-statements.asp. 
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rationality. Second, the pre-contract offering causes the aggregation of preferences in 
a rather arbitrary way.  
Stigler (1971) upended regulation as instituted primarily for the benefit of the public 
at large to regulation as the result of a political process of interested groups. On the 
demand side of regulation, industries “acquire” regulations from politicians as a profit 
maximizing device—direct subsidies, price-fixing, and control over entry by new 
rivals, substitutes, and complements—which is limited by political competition and 
administrative costs. On the supply side of regulation, “the representative and his 
party are rewarded for the discovery and fulfillment of the political desires of their 
constituency by success in election and the perquisites of office. [...] If the 
representative denies ten large industries their special subsidies of money or 
governmental power, they will dedicate themselves to the election of a more 
complaisant successor” (p. 11). In his view, political competition leads to less 
regulation.11 Stigler aligned the goals of third parties with particular regulations and 
envisioned (without formalization) the overturning of the incumbent politician by 
interest groups.  
Peltzman (1976) elaborated and generalized Stigler’s (1971) work by modeling 
political relationships analogously to tastes in consumer choice theory. Peltzman 
made several comparative statics predictions regarding the transfer of wealth—“cross-
subsidizing” through price-entry regulation—between groups in competitive and 
monopolistic markets with elastic and inelastic demand.12 Still, his treatment of the 
demand and supply of regulation (via the regulator’s objective function) abstracts 
from political tastes’ formation and change as well as from strategic partisan 
interplay.  
Peltzman’s political welfare approach won the day. From then on, most economic 
models of regulation tended to look at regulators as maximizing a welfare function 
influenced by both the profits of the regulated firm and the price paid by customers. 
The incentive theory of regulation—as developed following the pioneering work of, 
	
11 Unless regulation is characterized by a ratchet mechanism—once introduced, it is costly to remove 
it—which Stigler did not describe.  
12 Peltzman’s (1976) comparative statics are wide ranging, deriving differential regulatory outcomes 
depending on the business cycle, size of the market, price or cost inflation, technological change, 
economies of scale, and so on and so forth.  
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among others, Loeb and Magat (1979), Baron and Myerson (1982), and Laffont and 
Tirole (1993)—follows Peltzman’s “black box” approach to politics,13 and in that 
sense assumes away the process by which regulation arises and instead focuses all the 
economic apparatus into discerning the impact on optimal pricing of alternative 
informational arrangements.  
III. A Transaction-Cost Perspective on Regulation 
For Williamson (1976), the concurrence of bounded rationality and opportunism 
corresponds with the reality in utilities regulation.14 Williamson analyzed in detail the 
various propositions put forward to overcome these contractual difficulties, 
particularly by Demsetz (1968) and Posner (1972), who argued for different types of 
ex-ante competition for the market. 
Following Coase (1964),15 Williamson (1976, p. 73) emphasized the need to perform 
real institutional comparisons:  
“Merely to show that regulation is flawed, however, does not establish that 
regulation is an inferior mode of organizing economic activity. [...] Secondly, 
before regulation is supplanted, there is an obligation to assess the properties 
of the proposed alternative – not only in general, but also specifically with 
respect to the activity in question.  If the proposed mode is flawed in similar or 
different respects, the purported advantages of shifting out of regulation may 
be illusory.”  
Using the incipient transaction-cost economics approach, Williamson (1976, p. 75) 
highlighted seven features relevant to evaluating alternative modes of organizing 
natural monopoly supply (with emphasis on comparing franchise bidding to other 
forms of regulation—including no regulation): 
	
13  Observe that in most of the incentive theory of regulation literature, the regulatory process is 
described by a regulator’s utility function. Interesting extensions into hierarchical or more dynamic 
models of regulation have brought some institutional flavors to this literature. See, for example, 
Demski and Sappington (1987), Baron and Besanko (1987), and Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
14 Although Williamson (1976) analyzed franchise agreements and focuses on CATV, the classification 
is appropriate for the discussion of utilities in general. See Spiller (2013). 
15 Coase treated with reserve—and even irony—what he called “blackboard economics.” He preferred, 
instead, to “focus attention on the actual working of alternative arrangements” (Coase 1964). 
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“(1) the costs of ascertaining and aggregating consumer preferences through 
direct solicitation; (2) the efficacy of scalar bidding; (3) the degree to which 
technology is well developed; (4) demand uncertainty; (5) the degree to which 
incumbent suppliers acquire idiosyncratic skills; (6) the extent to which 
specialized, long-lived equipment is involved; and (7) the susceptibility of the 
political process to opportunistic representations and the differential 
proclivity, among modes, to make them.” 
These seven considerations can be reclassified into transaction cost (items 3—
technology, 4—demand uncertainty, 5 and 6—specific investments/skills) and 
political considerations (items 1—preference aggregation, 2—efficacy of scalar 
bidding, and 7—political opportunism). Ex-ante competition, whether of a “once-and-
for-all” or “renewable” contracts nature, overcomes the transaction-cost hazards 
raised by the complexity of the transaction at hand, but does not address the political 
considerations, particularly political opportunism.   
Incomplete long-term contracts, as Williamson (1976) points out, differ from 
regulations only in depth, not in essence.16 Incomplete long-term contracts enable 
renegotiation and soothe claims from unforeseen events. Nonetheless, a number of 
difficulties arise: hold-up and opportunistic renegotiations, i.e., successful bidders 
may want to renegotiate terms for their own benefit and thus jeopardize the execution 
of the contracts. Moreover, a (costly) regulatory agent is required to determine the 
level of output, monitor the activities of the investor, and cap prices.  
Coase, however, saw regulation in a different light. While Coase opposed the 
uncritical belief in the necessity of omnipresent regulation and purported to prove the 
sufficiency of market (contractual) mechanisms in the absence of transaction costs 
and with well-defined property rights, his thoughts on regulation were quite 
rudimentary and capsulated in his 1974 paper on lighthouses. Alike Demsetz and 
Posner (and to some extent similarly to Telser’s theory of the core approach), Coase 
saw regulation as a coordination problem of bringing multiple contractual parties 
	
16 “At the risk of oversimplification, regulation may be described contractually as a highly incomplete 
form of long-term contracting in which (1) the regulatee is assured an overall fair rate of return, in 
exchange for which (2) adaptations to changing circumstances are successively introduced without the 
costly haggling that attends such changes when parties to the contract enjoy greater autonomy” 
(Williamson 1976, 91). 
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(e.g., shipping companies, lighthouse operators) to an agreement, with the 
government providing the enforcement. Collective action tacitly implies, however, an 
arbitrary and costly aggregation of preferences,17 and assumes away the development 
of well-ordered social preferences (Arrow 1950).18  
As Coase clarified when awarded the Nobel Prize in 1991 (Coase 1992), transaction 
costs cannot be neglected and, therefore, the initial allocation of property rights 
matters. The normative conclusion is that the government should: (a) assign liability 
to the agents for whom avoiding the costs associated with the externality are the 
lowest or (b) create institutions that minimize transaction costs of corrective 
misallocation of resources. In practice, however, the highest user value of a resource 
is unknown ex ante and the reallocation of resources by government is costly, both of 
which are issues that fall directly within Williamson’s (1976) classification of 
regulatory contractual hazards.   
Spiller (2008, 2013), building on Williamson’s transaction-cost work, emphasized the 
implications of political hazards on the incentives of both the public agent and the 
utility investor and, thus, on the nature of regulation. Two are fundamental: third-
party and governmental opportunism. “Third parties” are agents who, while not 
explicitly part of public contracts, nevertheless can impact on their implementation 
and performance: i.e., watchdogs, interest groups, and—foremost—political 
opponents. Public agents are subject to third-party scrutiny simply because they play 
with public monies and, inasmuch as their office is contested, the potential for a 
challenge exists (Moszoro and Spiller 2012, 2014).  
The essence of public policy is its reliance on the state’s monopoly to use peoples’ 
monies without their expressed consent. Public utility regulation is not an exception, 
as it involves—directly or indirectly—the use of the state’s monopoly over public 
	
17 Following Williamson’s (1976) critique of Posner’s (1972) pre-season bids, take for example, low 
price–low quality package LL preferred by 40% of consumers wins over similar high price–high 
quality packages HH1, HH2, HH3, and HH4 chosen by 15% of consumers each. Can we conclude that 
LL is socially preferred? 
18 Consider the simple case of three consumers (indexed 1, 2, and 3) with heterogeneous preferences 
over low (L), medium (M), and high (H) price–quality sets, denoted LL, MM, and HH: 
C1: HH > MM > LL; C2: MM > LL > HH; and C3: LL > HH > MM.  
There will always be a majority in favor of changing the regime, whatever would be chosen. For 
example, given MM as the starting set, C1 and C3 would prefer HH over MM; then, C2 and C3 would 
prefer LL over HH; and, further, C1 and C3 would prefer MM over LL.  
10 
funds. Modern societies, then, will develop ways for public policy to be subject to 
public scrutiny so as to avoid corruption and graft. Thus, third-party supervision is 
fundamental in a democratic society.  
A key feature of interest groups as monitors is their biased nature. All interest groups 
have their own interests and agenda, and hence behave opportunistically, e.g., will 
provide information only when it is to their advantage. As it relates to government–
utility interactions, interested third parties may have incentives to challenge—when 
by such action they benefit—the “probity” of the interaction, thereby affecting 
directly the perceived probity of the public agent (regulator/politician) in charge. Such 
incentives exist when third parties compete with the public agent in the political 
market. Benefits, however, may arise also in the economic sphere. In both it may 
involve the displacement of the incumbent (and competing) public agent. In the 
political sphere, the challenge may be deemed successful if because of the challenge 
the public agent is replaced by an agent related, or more to the liking, of the interested 
third party. As it relates to the economic sphere, the challenge may be deemed 
successful if the private party is replaced or the terms of the contract or dimensions of 
the utility’s conduct are changed in ways that benefit the third party. But it is 
precisely because of competition in the political market that such challenges are 
particularly dangerous to the private and public agent alike. 
The exposure to third-party opportunism creates risks to both the public agent and the 
utility investor. In response, both will have incentives to formalize their relation (i.e., 
to move away from implicit agreements), and to make it highly specific. Furthermore, 
to mitigate the risk of third-party opportunism, these regulatory contracts will be 
designed so as to limit potential challenges, both at the signing and implementation 
stages. As a consequence, regulatory contracts will tend to demand relatively simple 
compensation schemes, limit high volatility in cash flows to the investor, and rigid 
procedural processes, including formal procedures for renegotiation. As in private 
contracting, though, these adjustments may not fully mitigate third-party 
opportunism, and government–utility investors’ interactions are likely to experience a 
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higher degree of conflict than contracts among private parties.19 Governments, then, 
will have difficulty adapting regulatory contracts without formal renegotiations, 
specific administrative processes and/or litigation. Furthermore, regulation will tend 
to be complex, involving multiple rules and procedures, and will be subject to 
substantial litigation. The added complexity required to limit the potential for third 
party opportunism will make regulation look as if marred by “red-tape,” “conflict 
driven” and “inefficient” overall. This inefficiency, however, may fail Williamson’s 
(1999) remediableness test. Thus, the perceived inefficiency of regulation is an 
equilibrium response to its hazards: third-party opportunism—a defining feature of 
public contracting in general and of regulation in particular. 
Governmental opportunism consists of the ability of governments to change the rules 
of the game through the standard use of governmental powers to extract quasi-rents 
from utility investors (Spiller 1995). The existence of sunk investments makes 
governmental opportunism a fundamental hazard in government–utility investor 
interactions. Sunk investments provide politicians with the opportunity to behave 
opportunistically vis-à-vis the investing company, exposing it to the risk of (creeping) 
expropriation. Facing the threat of governmental opportunism, utility investors will 
require particular safeguards to invest—i.e., the development of institutional 
arrangements that will limit the government’s ability to behave opportunistically once 
the utility undertook its investment program.20  
Therefore, even if the aggregation of preferences is feasible, collective action will not 
solve the two fundamental hazards facing regulators and the regulated—third-party 
and governmental opportunism. On the one hand, third parties can strategically trigger 
opportunistic challenges to the incumbent politician/regulator, leading to a potential 
loss of power21 and—on the other hand—anticipating disruptions, the regulator has 
	
19 In other words, the risk of third-party opportunism means that “relational” contracting is less likely 
to evolve in utility regulation. 
20  For example, safeguards will have to stipulate price setting and conflict resolution procedures 
(arbitration or judicial), investment policies, quality controls and so on and so forth, that are both 
credible, in the sense that the government will not be able to by-pass them easily, and at the same time 
substantially limit the government discretionary interpretation of the same. In other words, regulatory 
procedures, if credible, must restrain the government from opportunistically expropriating the utilities’ 
sunk investments (Spiller 2013). 
21 Consider the case of three consumers as presented in footnote 18, with the twist that C3 has slightly 
different preferences than previously: C1: HH > MM > LL; C2: MM > LL > HH; and C3: LL > MM > 
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incentives to expropriate the utility’s quasi-rents. Given these risks, the regulatory 
system that emerges to safeguard both the incumbent power and the regulated quasi-
rents, is highly formal and procedural. Thus, regulatory rigidity is the response to 
keep at bay politically motivated hazards both from opportunistic third parties and the 
government.  
IV. The Interplay of Political Contestability and Regulation 
Without detriment of more accurate sectorial definitions, network utilities can be 
generally characterized by (1) large and sunk capital investment, (2) locality, and 
(3) social interest. The mixture of large sunk capital investments exhibiting 
economies of scale and being locally produced and consumed, naturally leads to 
social and thus political interest.  Political interest, locality, and sunk investments lead 
to a dangerous cocktail of opportunistic incentives. On the one hand, sunk 
investments expose the utility to opportunistic behavior by the regulator, while, on the 
other hand, third-party opportunism may prevent regulators from fair behavior 
(Spiller 2013).  
The significance of these hazards will depend on the institutional circumstances of a 
state. Using North, Wallis, and Weingast’s (2009) nomenclature, in “open-access 
societies” public policies become impersonal and individuals have the ability to form 
organizations that provide enough political and economic competition. Thus, 
governments are constrained in their ability to subdue—whether by withdrawing 
funding, political harassment, or direct violence—the development and organization 
of interest groups, so the threat of third-party opportunism becomes more credible.  
In “natural state societies,” the ruling agents provide order by using the political 
system to limit economic entry to create rents, and then using the rents to stabilize the 
political system and limit violence. In these societies, the public agent has more 
	
HH. MM is a stable voting equilibrium, because there is no majority that prefers LL or HH over MM. 
Consider, further, the case where interested third parties (e.g., lobbyists of HH) strategically influence 
C3 to switch preferences to: LL > HH > MM. This will result in the instability of MM, as shown before. 
Note that it suffices that the change in preferences is second-order and in a fraction of the polity to 
disrupt the regulatory scheme. Moreover, this could result from the opportunistic mobilization of a 
relatively small constituency that did not vote in the previous election.  
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instruments at her disposal to set policies discretionarily. While the potential for 
governmental opportunism requires an institutional environment with few 
institutional limitations to governmental discretion—the essence of “natural states”—
the potential for third-party opportunism is limited in such environments by the same 
discretionary ability of governments. Third-party opportunism, then, would be more 
effective in “open-access” than in “natural state” societies, while the risk of 
governmental opportunism may be acute in the latter (Spiller 2013). 
The potential for the opportunistic use of legislative powers depends on the control 
the executive may exercise over the legislature. A fragmented polity may provide 
more assurances to investors than a highly unified government under the executive 
power (Spiller 1995). Similarly, a judiciary with a tradition of independence may put 
some limits on opportunistic governmental behavior. Table 1 presents a taxonomy of 
types of state and their most salient regulatory hazards. 
Table 1. A taxonomy of state types and regulatory hazards 
 Unified government Divided government 
Open-access  
Third-party opportunism limited by 
government discretion 
High risk of third-party opportunism 
Natural state 
High risk of governmental 
opportunism 
Governmental opportunism limited by 
independent judiciary22 
 
In the case of natural state societies with unified governments (highly susceptible to 
governmental opportunism), rate-of-return regulation could prove insufficient as a 
credible commitment of the government to limit its discretionary powers and attract 
investors. Hotelling’s (1938) proposal of state subsidy for the fixed cost of a network 
utility may deem more efficient—compared to Coase’s (1946) two-part tariff—to 
	
22 Natural state societies will rarely have a completely independent judiciary, as it will most likely be 
part of the ruling interest groups. Some natural state societies have shown, however, a sufficiently 
independent judiciary that efficiently limits the discretion of the executive. For example, in 2012 an 
Argentinian judge stopped the expropriation of radio and TV licenses from Clarín, a multimedia 
holding unfriendly to the ruling party (see http://www.razon.com.mx/spip.php?article151253). 
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avoid governmental opportunism (as there are no private sunk investments subject to 
expropriation).23 
As for open-access societies with divided governments, while the mitigation of 
governmental opportunism may be undertaken via contractual and/or procedural 
approaches (Levy and Spiller 1994), the mitigation of third-party opportunism is more 
difficult (Moszoro and Spiller 2012).  
V. Conclusions 
Coase’s (1960, 1974) views on regulation are neither tautological24 nor useless. He 
compared litigation to liability and equated government intervention with collective 
action, and proposed to assign the rights to where they would end up if there were no 
transaction and coordination costs. Coase’s regulatory contribution consisted in 
setting a reference point that showed the scope of regulation driven by positive 
transaction costs. Nonetheless, Coase purported the government as a non-contested 
agent—albeit with her own preference function—as exhibited in his 1959 paper on 
radio spectrum and 1974 paper on lighthouses, thus immune to politics and, 
in particular, to third-party and governmental opportunism.25  
Even if Coase and Demsetz’s market contestability and collective action conditions 
are met, a transaction-cost analysis of the hazards of public utility contracting leads to 
the conclusions that administrative regulation is deemed necessary for other than 
market failure and monopolistic pricing, namely opportunistic politics—i.e., the side 
effects of political contestability. It is our contention that this is the common cause of 
different types of regulatory structures.  
	
23 In fact, the movement in the developing world towards private management or public ownership, 
rather than private ownership of waterworks (highly sunk investments exhibiting high economies of 
scale and locality features) reflects the difficulties developing nations have had to restrain themselves 
from opportunistic behavior vis-à-vis private water operators.  See Spiller (2013). 
24 See, for example, Halpin (2007), Stigler (1977), and Usher (1998). 
25 The Trinity House, the authority responsible for chartering lighthouses, was incorporated in 1514 
during Henry VIII’s reign. Interestingly, the dawning of private lighthouses and the increase of public 
lighthouses run by the Trinity House corresponds in time to the uprising of the Parliament as the center 
of the British politics. 
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Instead of a theory-driven subject, Coase promoted the view that the economics 
profession should be empirical: “[Economists should] study the system as it is, 
understand why it works the way it does, and consider what changes could be made 
and what effects they would have.”26 Paying attention to the transaction costs inherent 
to regulation in a political environment opens up an ample perspective on regulatory 
features and performance for future research.  
In this paper, we have sketched the central arguments on the endogenous rise of 
regulatory rigidity in politically contestable environments as a way to signal probity 
and commitment from public agents, and, consequently, to reduce the risks of third-
party and governmental opportunism.  
	  
	
26 See interview with Ronald H. Coase, produced by: Chicago Multimedia Initiative Group, University 
of Chicago, 2012. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04zFygmeCUA (accessed March 
27, 2015). An example of Coase’s methodology of evaluating alternative feasible solutions is his 1970 
paper on public utility pricing.  
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